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IX—HOW DOES COHERENCE MATTER?
NIKO KOLODNY
Recently, much attention has been paid to ‘rational requirements’ and, es-
pecially, to what I call ‘rational requirements of formal coherence as
such’. These requirements are satisfied just when our attitudes are formal-
ly coherent: for example, when our beliefs do not contradict each other.
Nevertheless, these requirements are puzzling. In particular, it is unclear
why we should satisfy them. In light of this, I explore the conjecture that
there are no requirements of formal coherence. I do so by trying to con-
struct a theory of error for the idea that there are such requirements.
In recent work, particularly in value theory, it has become common
to say that we are ‘rationally required’ to see to it that our attitudes
are coherently related with one another, whatever else may be the
case. The intuitive idea is that incoherent attitudes give rise to a cer-
tain normative tension, or exert a kind of rational pressure on each
another, and this tension, or pressure, is relieved just when one of
the attitudes is revised.
1 The putative rational requirements that
have attracted perhaps the most attention are what I will call ‘re-
quirements of formal coherence as such’. Perhaps the simplest of
these is:
Non-Contradiction (n): One is rationally required (if at t one
believes p, then at t one does not believe not-p).
2
There are also said to be requirements of formal coherence as such
to avoid beliefs that are logically inconsistent more generally, to
have beliefs that are closed under logical consequence, to have de-
grees of belief that satisfy the axioms of probability, to intend the
1 See, for example, Broome (1999; 2005), Wallace (2001), and Scanlon (2007).
2 Although I believe that rational requirements are best understood as process requirements,
I formulate n as a ‘state’ requirement governing synchronic states, rather than as a ‘process’
requirement governing diachronic transitions between them. For present purposes, it makes
little difference.NIKO KOLODNY 230
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believed necessary means to what one intends, and to avoid intend-
ing what one believes one cannot jointly achieve. As John Broome
observes, these requirements of formal coherence as such are ‘wide
scope’, which is to say that there is no attitude that one must have,
or lack, in order to satisfy them. This is because they require formal
coherence as such, and there is no attitude that one must have, or
lack, to be formally coherent.
3 Although I will discuss some other
putative rational requirements,
4 I focus on requirements of formal
coherence, both because they occupy a special place in philosophy,
and because they pose a special puzzle.
According to a persistent strain of philosophical thought, these
requirements are the foundation, or sole fastness, of normativity.
Our desires for ends may call for desires for means, Humeans say,
but there is nothing beyond our desires to which our desires are an-
swerable. And there are theoretical analogues, such as the austere
Bayesianism that sees nothing beyond probabilistic coherence and
conditionalization. Others, most notably Kantians, aim to vindicate
more ambitious norms, such as the Moral Law itself. But they too
believe that vindicating these norms requires showing that they are
relatives, or analogues, of requirements of formal coherence as
such.
5
However, if we reflect on requirements of formal coherence from
the first-person standpoint of deliberation, then they can come to
seem, if not initially, then on reflection, puzzling. From the stand-
3 Apart from this exception, that probabilistic coherence requires a degree of belief of one in
logical truths and of zero in logical falsehoods.
4 In §III, I discuss Believed Reason: the requirement of coherence between beliefs about our
reasons for attitudes and those attitudes themselves; and, in §IV, internalist requirements of
epistemic justification: narrow-scope requirements of informal coherence between cognitive
states (beliefs and perceptual states). A third class might be internalist requirements of prac-
tical justification: narrow-scope requirements of informal coherence among cognitive states
with non-normative contents and intentions or desires. See Parfit (ms.), Setiya (2007), Smith
(2004b), and Wedgwood (2003). While these last two kinds are ‘rational requirements,’ in
the sense of requirements governing relations among attitudes independently of anything
beyond those attitudes, they stretch our ordinary attributions of ‘irrationality’, which are
restricted to cases in which the subject is more immediately at odds with himself. It was this
more common sense of ‘rationality’ that I mostly had in mind in Kolodny (2005), although
I was unclear about this. Note also that, to the extent that any of the three classes of rational
requirements discussed in this note is defined in terms of reasons, it is unsuited to the role
discussed in the next paragraph.
5 Compare the rationalist position described by Smith (2004a, p. 250): ‘If morality requires
some limited form of altruism then … the principle of limited altruism is a principle … on
all fours with modus ponens and modus tollens and the principle of means–ends.’HOW DOES COHERENCE MATTER? 231
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point of theoretical deliberation—which asks ‘What ought I to
believe?’—what ultimately matters is simply what is likely to be
true, given what there is to go on. From the standpoint of practical
deliberation—which asks ‘What ought I to do?’—what ultimately
matters is simply what would be choiceworthy, because it would be,
say, pleasurable or right. It is unclear how formal coherence in itself
could matter in one of these ways. After all, formal coherence may
as soon lead one away from, as toward, the true and the good.
Thus, if someone asks from the deliberative standpoint ‘What is
there to be said for making my attitudes formally coherent as such?’
there seems, on reflection, no satisfactory answer. In addition to this
‘Problem of Normativity’, as I call it, there is also the ‘Problem of
Conflict’. Some requirements of formal coherence not only are not
explained by a concern for the true and the good, but moreover
would forbid what that concern requires. If there are such require-
ments, then, no matter how conscientious and informed we are, we
cannot help but be either irrational, or unreasonably unconcerned
with the true and the good.
Animated by these problems, I explore a conjecture: that there are
no requirements of formal coherence as such. I ask whether we can
explain, with other resources, the phenomena that make them plau-
sible. I try to make a case for the optimistic answer, that we can. Re-
quirements of formal coherence seem plausible, I suggest, because
they would explain certain ‘violation claims’—to the effect that
when our attitudes are formally incoherent we violate a
requirement—and certain ‘satisfaction claims’—to the effect that
when we make our attitudes formally coherent we satisfy a require-
ment. We may be able to explain several of the violation claims, I
suggest, by appealing instead to ‘what reason requires’: that is, to
what we ought to believe or choose given what matters from the
standpoint of deliberation. The attitudes that reason requires, in any
given situation, are formally coherent. Thus, if one has formally in-
coherent attitudes, it follows that one must be violating some re-
quirement of reason. The problem is not, as the idea of
requirements of formal coherence as such suggests, that incoherent
attitudes are at odds with each other. It is instead that when atti-
tudes are incoherent, it follows that one of these attitudes is at odds
with the reason for it—as it would be even if it were not part of an
incoherent set. This, in turn, provides resources for explaining theNIKO KOLODNY 232
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satisfaction claims, or at least their appeal.
6
However, this error theory has several points of stress. It rejects
intuitions that some may endorse, and it relies on premisses that
others may doubt. So I am not confident that I rule out the more
pessimistic, if more interesting, answer: that while we cannot find a
place for requirements of formal coherence as such, we cannot do
without them either.
In §§I, III, and IV, I try to construct an error theory for n, pausing
in §§II and IV to spell out the Problems of Normativity and Con-
flict. In §V, I ask whether this error theory can be extended to other
putative requirements of formal coherence as such. I conclude, in
§VI, by discussing one source of the appeal of the view that require-
ments of formal coherence as such are the core or basis of normativ-
ity. This is the idea that they are ‘undeniable’ or ‘inescapable’ in a
way in which no other normative claims can be.
I
An Error Theory for n: Explaining the Violation Claim. We are at-
tracted to n, in large part, because it would explain:
Violation Claim about Non-Contradiction (vn): If one believes
at t that p and believes at t that not-p, then one violates some
requirement.
It may seem that the requirement in question must be n. It may seem
that it cannot be a requirement of reason, since we can know that
one violates it without knowing anything about one’s reason. But
this is too quick.
In what follows, I use, somewhat stipulatively, the mass noun,
‘reason’, to mean not the faculty, but instead the collection of con-
siderations on the basis of which we settle the questions: ‘What to
believe? What to choose?’—that is, the material of first-person de-
liberation, within which these questions are asked.
7 So understood,
6 Without meaning to associate them with any errors in the present paper, I sense that
broadly the same line is pursued by Raz (2005), Scanlon (2007), and Schroeder (ms.).
7 This owes much to Hieronymi (2005). I do not mean to suggest that we usually deliberate
before believing or acting, let alone in explicitly normative terms.HOW DOES COHERENCE MATTER? 233
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one’s reason for a belief or choice might be a function of one’s atti-
tudes, contents of one’s attitudes, facts that one has certain atti-
tudes, or facts independent of one’s attitudes. It depends on the
substantive question of what matters within deliberation.
8
Focusing on the case of belief, and bracketing (until §IV) what ev-
idence
9 consists in, it is substantively plausible that:
Evidentialism: There is reason for one to believe p only in so
far as the evidence indicates, or makes it likely, that p is true,
and there is reason for one not to believe p only in so far as the
evidence indicates that p is false.
If we accept Evidentialism, then it is also plausible that:
Stronger Evidence (se): One has sufficient reason (i.e., reason
permits one) to believe p only if the evidence indicates that p
more strongly than it indicates that not-p.
10
One ‘lacks sufficient reason’ to X, or ‘reason does not permit’ one to
X, just when one ought not to X on the basis of one’s reason. One
intuitive argument for se is that it explains:
Comparative Suspension (cs): When the evidence that p and
that not-p is evenly balanced, one is required neither to believe
that p nor to believe that not-p.
11
And we can gesture toward a deeper rationale for se, if we analogize
8 On some these possibilities, reasons and rationality may overlap. In Kolodny (2005), I
more or less defined ‘reasons’ as facts independent of attitudes. Although I am still drawn to
this view as a substantive thesis, I am here defining ‘reasons’ in a less committal way, as
what matters in deliberation.
9 I use the word ‘evidence’ in a broader sense than usual.
10 se states only a necessary condition. First, there may also need to be sufficient evidence,
in an absolute sense, to decide the question. Second, it may need to be the case that one
either has sufficient reason, of a non-evidential sort, to make up one’s mind, or will make up
one’s mind, whether p. See Brady (ms.), however, for doubts that the question whether to
make up one’s mind can be so neatly distinguished from the question how to make it up.
Note also that the threshold of sufficient evidence may depend on the importance of the
question, a point made by Fantl and McGrath (2002), among others.
11 Notice that n cannot explain cs. If se fails, then epistemic reason will sometimes permit
both believing p and believing not-p. While n would prohibit adopting both beliefs in such
cases, n would not prohibit adopting one of the two beliefs arbitrarily.NIKO KOLODNY 234
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epistemic reason to a kind of decision theory.
12 Of course, it is un-
clear how far this analogy can be taken, and there may well be an-
other rationale for se. But the analogy provides at least a suggestive
model. Suppose that one will have, or has sufficient reason to have,
an opinion whether p, for each proposition p in some finite set, S.
Now understand of a ‘decision’ as a set of beliefs (not necessarily
voluntarily formed, of course) whose contents belong to S, an ‘out-
come’ as a possible world, and the ‘payoff’ of a given decision at an
given outcome as the sum, for all p in the decision, of T(p)—the val-
ue of a true belief on the question whether p—if p is true and
−F(p)—the value of avoiding a false belief on the question whether
p—if p is false, where T(p), F(p)0.
13 The ‘probability’ that p is the
degree of evidential support that p, 0E(p)1. If, as seems intui-
tive, the ‘decision rule’ is maximizing expected value, then epistemic
reason permits believing that p only if:
E(p)*T(p)−E(p is false)*F(p)0.
Suppose first that E(p is false)=E(not-p). And suppose next that
F(p)T(p): that epistemic reason is inherently conservative, caring
more about avoiding falsity than acquiring truth. Then epistemic
reason permits the belief that p only if:
E(p)E(not-p),
which is just se.
14
Whatever its rationale, se entails:
12 This is a familiar idea, although typically pursued with grander ambitions. See Percival
(2002) for a survey. It is often objected that this idea implies that epistemic reason would
require us to believe something for which we have poor evidence, if believing it would
increase the probability of believing more truths and fewer falsehoods overall. My use of the
idea here does not imply this, because the only probabilities relevant to believing p are the
degrees of evidence that p is true or false (and also because the only relevant truths and
falsehoods are those on which one will have, or has sufficient reason to have, an opinion).
13 I assume that p is false and not-p are answers to the question whether p, so that T(p)=T(p
is false)=T(not-p) and F(p)=F(p is false)=F(not-p).
14 Since epistemic reason requires decisions on the basis of degrees of evidence, rather than
on the basis of degrees of belief, this model does not require that the agent have degrees of
belief, much less that they be probabilistic. This is important, given the doubts about formal
requirements of probabilistic coherence raised in §V. However, if degrees of evidence are
not probabilistic, then epistemic reason, so understood, may issue conflicting directives. It
may seem implausible that degrees of evidence are probabilistic: in particular, that the evi-HOW DOES COHERENCE MATTER? 235
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First Comment on Reason Patterns (r1): In any given case, ei-
ther one lacks sufficient reason to (i.e., reason requires one not
to) believe p, or one lacks sufficient reason to believe not-p.
And r1 explains vn. If someone believes p and believes not-p, then
either he believes p without sufficient reason, or he believes not-p
without sufficient reason. So he violates some requirement of rea-
son. If we do not know anything about his evidence, then we do not
know which requirement he violates. But we know that he violates
at least one of these.
n and r1 are different claims. Whereas n is a wide-scope, rational
requirement of a disjunction of responses, r1 is a disjunctive obser-
vation about possible, or actual, narrow-scope requirements of rea-
son. If one has contradictory beliefs, then one satisfies n no matter
which belief one gives up. One satisfies the requirements in r1, by
contrast, only if one gives up the specific belief, or beliefs, for which
one lacks sufficient reason. Put another way, n requires a change
from one only if one both believes p and believes not-p. By contrast,
the requirements in r1 may require a change from one even if one
has only one of the beliefs. If one lacks sufficient reason to believe p,
one should drop that belief, whether or not one believes not-p. In
other words, in the case of n, it is the tension between the beliefs
that necessitates a change, whereas in the case of the requirements
in r1, it is the tension between (at least) one of the beliefs and the
evidence that necessitates a change. More fundamentally: n repre-
sents a concern with the coherence of our beliefs as such. The possi-
ble, or actual, requirements mentioned in r1, by contrast, represent
a concern to follow the evidence toward the true and away from the
false.
We might now be drawn to a simple error theory for n. What we
really accept is:
dence for any two propositions stands in some precise ratio. By way of a reply, we might
adopt the pretence that, for every proposition, there is a definite degree of evidence that is
probabilistic, but for some propositions, their degrees of evidence are, so to speak, un-
known for the purposes of the epistemic decision. If not enough is known to settle whether
E(p)/E(not-p)F(p)/T(p), then we need some other decision rule: perhaps maximin, or
maximizing expected value on the assumption of equal probability. With either of these
rules, F(p)T(p) would also explain:
Absolute of Suspension of Belief: When there is not enough evidence to decide the
question whether p, one is required neither to believe that p, nor to believe that not-p.NIKO KOLODNY 236
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(r1) In any given situation, either it will be the case that (one is
required by reason not to believe p), or it will be the case
that (one is required by reason not to believe not-p).
However, careless about scope and the distinction between reasons
and rationality, we confuse this with:
(n) In any given case, one is required by rationality (either not
to believe p or not to believe not-p).
And so we casually assent to n. If we paid attention to how n differs
from r1, however, we would simply disavow n.
15
This simple error theory surely captures much of our attraction to
n. Many who casually endorse the wide-scope, Broomian n may re-
ally have r1 in mind.
16 And it would be entirely congenial to my ap-
15 It might be objected: ‘r1 entails n, so long as disjunctions may be introduced within the
scope of “required”, as Standard Deontic Logic allows.’ If disjunction introduction is per-
missible, then r1 also entails an endless list of ‘idle’ principles like n#: One is required (either
not to believe p, or not to believe not-p, or to dance the Hokey-Pokey); or n##: One is
required (either not to believe p, or not to believe not-p, or both to believe p and to believe not-
p). With Føllesdal and Hilpinen (1971) and Wedgwood (2006), one might defend idle prin-
ciples by offering a pragmatic explanation of their seeming oddity. It is never conversationally
appropriate to assert n# or n##, because we are always in a position to assert the more
informative r1. But if n is merely an idle principle—if its only justification is that it follows,
via disjunction introduction, from r1—then it is never conversationally appropriate to assert
n either, because we are always in a position to assert the more informative r1. This indicates,
as is anyway evident, that those who do endorse n do not view it merely as an idle principle.
This might be because, as the simple error theory claims, they confuse it with r1. Or it might
be because they accept the Satisfaction Claim about n below (which implies that n has a sta-
tus that n## lacks). At any rate, the position that I am questioning is that n is something more
than an idle principle. The claim that it is nothing more is largely sympathetic to my sceptical
view. I am grateful to Ralph Wedgwood for suggesting this line of objection.
16 In general, comments on reason patterns like  r1 are not well distinguished from require-
ments of formal coherence like n. For example, Darwall (2006) writes: ‘Believing q is ratio-
nal “relative to” there being reason to believe both p and if p, then q, respectively,’ which
suggests the comment on reason patterns:
(1) If one is required by reason to believe p and believe if p then q, then one is re-
quired by reason to believe q.
The next paragraph begins, ‘The situation is exactly analogous in instrumental reasoning,’
and ends, ‘The practical analogue of modus ponens transfers rational support from the end
and the belief to the means.’ This suggests a comment on reason patterns:
If one is required by reason to intend E and believe that one Es only if one Ms, then
one is required by reason to intend M.
Yet sandwiched between those remarks is: ‘The most that instrumental rationality can re-
quire is that one either take the means or give up either the end or the belief about the means
indispensability,’ which, on its face, suggests a rational requirement of formal coherence:HOW DOES COHERENCE MATTER? 237
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proach if this simple error theory captured all of our attraction to n.
But I worry that it does not. Contrast two possible responses to be-
lieving p and believing not-p. First, one remains inconsistent, con-
tinuing both to believe p and to believe not-p. Second, one makes
one’s beliefs consistent, but ‘against reason’. One ceases believing p,
which is, in light of the evidence, sufficiently likely to be true that
reason requires it, while continuing to believe not-p, which is, in
light of the evidence, sufficiently likely to be false that reason for-
bids it. Still, this second response seems to satisfy some requirement
that the first does not. So says:
Satisfaction Claim about Non-Contradiction (sn): Suppose
that one believes p and believes not-p. If one either ceases to
believe p, or ceases to believe not-p, then one thereby satisfies
some requirement that one would not satisfy if one continued
both to believe p and to believe not-p.
This requirement cannot be one of reason, it seems, since the sec-
ond, consistent response satisfies no requirement of reason that the
first, inconsistent response does not. So, the requirement, it seems,
must be n.
One is required by rationality (if one intends to E and believes that one Es only if one
Ms, then one intends to M).
Moreover, in the appended footnote, Darwall describes rationality as being concerned with
‘incoherent combinations of attitudes’, and cites Broome’s discussion of rational require-
ments of the wide-scope form. Consider, as another example, an epistemic rule described by
Boghossian (2001):
(er2) If you are justified in believing p, and justified in believing that ‘If p, then q’,
then believe q or give up one of the other beliefs.
On the one hand, if you really are justified in believing p and justified in believing ‘If p, then
q,’ then you ought to deduce q and ought not give up p or if p then q. As comment (1) and
Boghossian’s similar principle (ep2) suggest, deducing q will produce a justified belief. Giv-
ing up one of the other beliefs is, by hypothesis, giving up a justified belief. On the other
hand, if you believe p and believe if p then q, then the rational requirement of formal co-
herence,
(2) You are rationally required (if you believe p and believe if p then q, then you be-
lieve q),
requires you either to believe q, or to give up one of those beliefs. But it requires this
whether or not your beliefs are justified. Thus, (er2) seems a kind of amalgam, with the
antecedent of comment on reason patterns (1) and the consequent of requirement of for-
mal coherence (2).NIKO KOLODNY 238
©2007 The Aristotelian Society
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. CVII, Part 3
II
The Problem of Normativity. Why not then accept n? Because it is
hard to see what can be said, within or to the first-person stand-
point of deliberation, for satisfying n. It is clear what can be said for
satisfying n ‘with reason’: by ceasing to believe not-p, which is suffi-
ciently likely, given the evidence, to be false that reason forbids it,
and continuing to believe p, which is sufficiently likely, given the ev-
idence, to be true that reason requires it. But precisely what distin-
guishes n from r1, as we have just seen, is that one satisfies n just as
well if one satisfies it ‘against reason’: if one ceases to believe p and
continues to believe not-p.
17 If nothing can be said for satisfying n
even in this way—if something can be said only for satisfying n with
reason—then r1 would appear to be the sole normative truth in the
vicinity. Yet what can be said for satisfying n even in this way?
‘There is at least some pro tanto reason to cease believing p in this
case,’ it might be said. ‘It avoids the risk, however small, of a false
belief.’ First, since this reason is merely pro tanto, and is outweighed
by reason to believe p, it is not clear how it can account for the
stringency of n: its presumed status as a requirement, which it needs
to explain sn. Second, since there is pro tanto reason of this kind
against any belief, in any situation, it captures nothing particular to
resolving incoherence. Finally, there is equally pro tanto reason for
any belief, in any situation; it is a chance to believe something true.
So if this appeal to ‘at least some pro tanto reason’ supports a prin-
ciple recommending coherence, then it supports equally a principle
recommending incoherence.
Next one might grant that, when we satisfy n by ceasing to be-
lieve p, we do not in fact come closer to what reason requires: be-
lieve more of what, in light of the evidence, is (sufficiently) likely
true and believe less of what, in light of the evidence, is (sufficiently)
likely false. But one might suggest we still take insufficient, although
perhaps necessary, means to coming closer to what reason requires.
17 Might it be argued that no way of satisfying n is ever against reason? First, if avoiding fal-
sity were infinitely more important than acquiring truth, then this would be so. Second, if the
‘decision rule’ were maximax, then ceasing to believe p would not be against reason. Not
believing p and believing not-p maximizes the payoff in some outcome, whereas believing p
and believing not-p maximizes the payoff in no outcome. However, satisfying n by ceasing
both to believe p and to believe not-p, which also maximizes the payoff in no outcome,
would be neither with reason nor against it. In any event, both suggestions are implausible.HOW DOES COHERENCE MATTER? 239
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However, there is no helpful sense in which, by satisfying n as one
does in this case—that is, by not believing p and believing not-p—
one takes ‘means’ to believing what reason requires in this case—
that is, believing p and not believing not-p.
18
Lastly, one might grant that satisfying n as one does in this case
does not bring one closer to what reason requires in this case, but
propose that having a disposition to satisfy n over the long run
brings one closer to what reason requires in the long run. But, first,
if one can satisfy n against reason in this case, then why cannot a
disposition to satisfy n lead one to satisfy n against reason serially?
One might reply that, although a disposition to satisfy n might lead
one away from reason if left on its own, it will not lead one away
from reason if accompanied, as presumably it will be, by a more or
less reliable disposition not to believe what reason forbids. Yet to
the extent that one already has a more or less reliable disposition
not to believe what reason forbids, one will tend not to believe con-
tradictory things in the first place, and so the disposition to satisfy n
becomes superfluous.
19 Second, even if satisfying n over the long run
did lead one closer to reason over the long run, it would still not ex-
plain sn. sn claims that one satisfies a requirement by making one’s
beliefs consistent in a particular case, not that one does so by mak-
ing one’s beliefs consistent over the long run.
Taking a new tack, one might suggest that some ‘constitutive’ or
‘conceptual’ claim underwrites the normativity of n. But it is not
clear how. The claim that:
For an attitude to be a belief just is (in part) for it to be correct
just when it is true
may well underwrite Evidentialism.
20 But, as we have seen, Eviden-
tialism does not explain n. The claim that:
18 Of course, a necessary condition of (believing p and not believing not-p) is (either (believ-
ing p and not believing not-p) or (not believing p and believing not-p)). So one might say that
in not believing p and believing not-p one takes a necessary means to not believing not-p.
However, another necessary condition is (either (believing p and not believing not-p) or
(both believing p and believing not-p)). So, by the same logic, in continuing to have contra-
dictory beliefs—or, indeed, in doing anything at all—one takes necessary means to coming
closer to what reason requires in the same way. This cannot explain sn, which claims that
one satisfies a requirement in ceasing to believe p that one would not satisfy if one continued
with contradictory beliefs. Thanks to Ralph Wedgwood for suggesting this line of objection.
19 I pursue this line of argument at greater length in Kolodny (ms.a).
20 See Shah (2006).NIKO KOLODNY 240
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For an attitude to be a belief just is (in part) for it to satisfy n
would not support, and may even be incompatible with, the norma-
tive claim that beliefs ought to satisfy to n. The claim that:
For a subject to be a believer just is (in part) for certain of his
attitudes to satisfy n for the most part.
21
would explain at most why we ought to satisfy n for the most part,
not why we ought to satisfy n in any particular case. Lastly, consider:
For an attitude to be a belief just is (in part) for n to apply to
it—so that to know what a belief is just is, in part, to know
that n is a norm for belief,
and
For a subject to be a (self-conscious, rational) believer just is (in
part) for him to accept that n applies to certain of his
attitudes—so that not to accept that n is a norm for belief is to
cease to be a (self-conscious, rational) believer.
22
These claims do not answer the question being raised from the de-
liberative point of view, ‘Why should I satisfy n?’
23 At most, they
answer the different question, ‘Why should I accept that I should
satisfy n?’, forcing the deliberator to accept, awkwardly, that he
should satisfy n, without any answer as to why he should. More
generally, once we have distinguished n and r1, these constitutive
claims seem less plausible. Perhaps the real constitutive claims in the
vicinity involve r1, instead of n. Finally, since, as we have seen, we
have no evidential reasons for satisfying n, these constitutive claims
would have to offer us non-evidential considerations. If Evidential-
ism is true, then these considerations cannot be reasons for belief.
This is a problem not only for n, but also for each of the require-
ments of formal coherence, since each governs, inter alia, belief.
Often when we cannot explain in other terms why we ought to
satisfy a putative norm, the counsel of good sense is to acknowledge
that we ought to satisfy the norm for its own sake. But it is not, as
21 Compare Davidson (2004).
22 Compare Korsgaard (1996).
23 Note in particular that neither gives the answer that unless one satisfies n one lacks beliefs.HOW DOES COHERENCE MATTER? 241
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far as I can see, the counsel of good sense in this case. Simply put, it
seems outlandish that the kind of psychic tidiness that n, or any oth-
er requirement of formal coherence, enjoins should be set alongside
such final ends as pleasure, friendship, and knowledge.
24 And,
again, such ‘reasons’ would not be evidential.
Notice we have been asking: What, if anything, can be said for
satisfying n, within, or addressed to, the first-person standpoint of
deliberation—the standpoint from which we decide what to believe
or choose? We could ask a different question: How, if at all, can a
person’s satisfying n be positively appraised from the (typically)
third-person standpoint of evaluation—the standpoint from which
we approve or disapprove, praise or blame what someone believes
or chooses?
25 Our failure to find an answer to the first question, it
might be said, need not rule out an answer to the second. ‘We can
evaluate a person as beautiful, or some organ of hers as functioning
properly, without implying that there are reasons, that might carry
weight within the deliberative standpoint, for her to believe or
choose anything. Likewise, we can evaluate someone as functioning
properly, or manifesting a virtue, when she makes her beliefs coher-
ent, without implying that there are reasons for her to believe as she
does.’ But, first, it is obscure why satisfying n should merit positive
appraisal.
26 And, second, an answer to this evaluative question
would not be an answer to our original, deliberative one.
27
24 Compare Wedgwood (2003).
25 A related question is whether n represents a regularity to which we can appeal in giving
‘rational explanations,’ typically from the third-person point of view, of the subject’s
responses.
26 I believe that we can explain why satisfying other rational requirements, such as Believed
Reason, and the internalist requirements of epistemic and practical justification, merits pos-
itive appraisal. For one thing, conforming manifests dispositions that lead one to closer to
reason over the long run, at least when joined with certain other dispositions. There are also
less instrumental grounds. About Believed Reason, see Kolodny (ms.a); about practical jus-
tification, see Setiya (2007).
27 ‘If satisfying n merits positive appraisal,’ it might be said, ‘then this is an answer to the
deliberative question. The reason why you should satisfy n is that it would be an episode of
proper functioning, or display a virtue.’ However, the fact that A-ing would display the vir-
tue of kindness, modesty, courage, etc. is not typically itself reason (let alone conclusive
reason) to A: a consideration that carries weight in deliberation whether to A, even deliber-
ation of the most reflective sort. First, this will typically get the relevant value, and locus of
value, wrong. What matters is not one’s own kindness, for example, but instead another’s
relief from suffering. Moreover, with many virtues, being prepared to take them, on reflec-
tion, as reasons is incompatible with possessing them. See Moran (1993). Finally, whether
we have reason to A typically depends on whether the situation is a certain way (for exam-NIKO KOLODNY 242
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III
An Error Theory for n: Explaining the Satisfaction Claim. If we re-
ject n, then we need some other explanation of sn, or at least of its
appeal. Suppose that one believes p and believes not-p. Plausibly,
both this fact and the general truth r1 are available to one. So, plau-
sibly, one is in a position to know that either one believes p without
sufficient reason, or one believes not-p without sufficient reason. In
light of this, if it matters sufficiently whether p or whether not-p,
reason plausibly requires one to believe that one lacks sufficient rea-
son to have at least one of these beliefs, and/or to try to decide
which belief, or beliefs, one lacks sufficient reason to have.
28 Sup-
pose one responds to either of these ‘second-order’ requirements of
reason. Then either one arrives at a conclusion about which belief,
or beliefs, one lacks sufficient reason to have, or one does not. If one
arrives at a conclusion that one lacks sufficient reason for certain
beliefs, then one would be defying one’s own judgement to refuse to
revise those beliefs. If, on the other hand, one reaches no conclusion
about which belief, or beliefs, to revise, then one would be defying
one’s own judgement, in much the same way, to refuse to suspend
belief. A live doubt has been raised whether reason permits one to
believe p, and one is presently deliberating whether it does. To be-
lieve that p before having concluded that reason permits one to be-
lieve that p is to defy one’s own judgement. (The same, of course,
goes for believing not-p.) It is irrational to defy one’s own judge-
28 This may also count as a rational requirement, as Fabrizio Cariani points out to me.
ple, whether our ministrations would relieve his suffering), whereas whether we display
the virtue depends only on our believing it to be that way. None of this counts against the
‘Reasons’ thesis of Setiya (2007): ‘The fact that p is reason for A to phi just in case A has a
collection of psychological states, C, such that the disposition to be moved to phi by C-
and-the-belief-that-p is a good disposition of practical thought, and C contains no false
beliefs.’ This does not entail that the fact that A-ing would display a good disposition of
practical thought is itself a reason to A. Setiya argues persuasively that neither (as I once
thought) the left-hand, ‘deliberative’, side of the biconditional is explanatorily prior, nor
that (as Smith 1994 seems to suggest) the right-hand, ‘evaluative’, side is prior. Instead, I
am now inclined to think, different questions privilege different sides. When we ask what
to choose, for example, what matters are the reasons in favour of possible choices. The
fact that someone with the relevant virtue, if she knew the relevant particulars, would A
matters insofar as it indicates that, as she would discern, there are some reasons or other
to A. When we ask whether we are to be praised or blamed for A-ing, by contrast, what
matters is whether we displayed the relevant virtue. Whether there were reasons to A is
neither here nor there.HOW DOES COHERENCE MATTER? 243
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ment in either of these ways, as is codified by:
Believed Reason (br): If one believes at t that reason requires
one to have attitude A,
29 then one is rationally required to form
or sustain, going forward from t, on the basis of this belief, A,
and if one believes at t that reason does not permit one to have
A, then one is rationally required to revise or refrain from
forming, on the basis of this belief, going forward from t, A,
and if one is deliberating at t, in response to a live doubt,
whether reason permits one to have A, but has not yet conclud-
ed that it does,
30 then one is rationally required to revise or re-
frain from forming, going forward from t, A.
Our aim, recall, is to explain the requirement in sn: a requirement
that one violates if one continues with incoherent beliefs, but satis-
fies if one makes one’s beliefs coherent, even in a way that leaves
one no closer to, or even further from, what reason requires. My
suggestion is that the requirement in sn is either of the second-order
requirements of reason, or the rational requirement br. If one satis-
fies either of the second-order requirements and br, then one’s be-
liefs will be coherent. Yet one might satisfy these requirements in a
way that leaves one no closer to what reason requires. This is be-
cause, in complying with the second-order requirements, one might
fail to reach the correct conclusion about what reason does require.
‘How is this progress?’ one might well wonder. ‘After all, the
same considerations that show that we have no reason to satisfy n
against reason show likewise that we have no reason to satisfy br
against reason: that is, when our belief about our reasons is false.’
This is all true. However, the worry was that there was nothing that
could be said, within or to the first-person standpoint of delibera-
tion, for satisfying n even in the wrong way. And there is, in a way,
something that can be said, within or to the first-person standpoint
of deliberation, for satisfying br in the wrong way. Take someone
29 Of course, no one will readily express his or her belief in these terms. Recall that ‘reason
requires’ is, even relative to philosophical usage, somewhat artificial and regimented. In the
case of believing that p, the relevant judgement might be more commonly expressed as:
‘There’s compelling evidence that p,’ or ‘It’s overwhelmingly likely that p.’
30 This clause, or at least the phrase ‘live doubt,’ needs further elaboration. As Mike Martin
and Mike Titelbaum point out to me, there are cases in which it does not seem irrational to
continue believing something while considering whether there is sufficient evidence for it.NIKO KOLODNY 244
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who is required by br to believe p. Given that br requires her to be-
lieve p, she must satisfy its antecedent, by judging that she ought to
believe p. Since she judges that she ought to believe p, and since be-
lieving p is what br requires, it will seem to her, of what br requires,
that she ought to do it. It is not as though she sees herself as having,
or needing, some special reason to realize such-and-such a pattern
among her beliefs: a reason of the kind for which we searched in
vain in the last section. Instead, she just judges, perhaps falsely, that
the evidence makes it (sufficiently) likely that p. Furthermore, we
can advise, or do something that looks like advise, her to believe as
br requires, by drawing her attention to the content of her own be-
lief that the evidence makes it likely that p. In sum, while reason
does not require one to satisfy br, we can explain why it will inevi-
tably seem to one as though reason requires it. And this may be
enough for the error theory for n that we are trying to construct.
31
IV
Objections to the Error Theory for n.
1. Akratic and Unreflective Cases. According to sn, one satisfies a
requirement if one makes one’s beliefs coherent. However, one can
make one’s beliefs coherent in ways that do not satisfy the second-
order requirements or br (and do not lead one closer to reason).
First, one can make one’s beliefs coherent akratically: in defiance of
one’s own judgement about the reasons for those beliefs.
32 Second,
one might make one’s beliefs coherent unreflectively: without any
conscious reflection on one’s reason at all. (This might happen, for
example, when it does not matter sufficiently whether p for one to
believe anything about one’s reason, or to try to decide which belief,
or beliefs, to give up.)
Here is a partial response. Akratic and unreflective cases may in-
volve the manifestation of an unconscious disposition. Where un-
31 This is the ‘Transparency Account’ of Kolodny (2005). I need to say more to defend it.
For careful and forceful objections, see Bridges (ms.) and Hussain (ms.). The fact that satis-
fying br qualifies one for positive appraisal (see the penultimate note of §II) may accom-
modate some of these objections.
32 I thank Alex Sarch and Nishi Shah, in particular, for pressing me on this.HOW DOES COHERENCE MATTER? 245
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conscious dispositions are at issue, there is no standpoint of
deliberation, and so our normative question, ‘Why conform in this
way?’, does not arise. However, manifesting an unconscious disposi-
tion may qualify one, or some sub-personal part of one, for positive
appraisal. Consider an unconscious disposition not to believe p,
when in C, where C is a condition in which reliably, but fallibly, one
lacks sufficient reason to believe p. First, because this disposition is
reliable, it leads one closer to reason over the long run. This ex-
plains why its manifestations are appraised positively. Second, its
manifestations make one’s beliefs coherent. Finally, because this dis-
position is fallible, its manifestations may lead one no closer to rea-
son in particular cases. Such a disposition may be manifested in
akratic and unreflective cases. This would explain why we are apt to
think that even in akratic and unreflective cases, the subject does
well, in at least one respect.
The difficulty is that there is no guarantee that such a disposition
is manifested in every akratic or unreflective case. The only disposi-
tion that would be manifested in every akratic or unreflective case
would be a disposition to make one’s beliefs consistent in any way,
it matters not which. But it is not clear why this disposition, or its
manifestations, should be appraised positively. As I noted earlier, it
would not lead us closer to reason over the long run.
33 Still we may
believe that we do well, even in these akratic and unreflective cases.
I wonder, though, whether we do not simply overgeneralize here.
34
33 I discuss these dispositions in Kolodny (ms.a).
34 Pam Hieronymi, Seana Shiffrin and Sven Nyholm have suggested, in effect, that one
might accept, in place of Believed Reason:
De Re Believed Reason: If the contents of one’s beliefs at t entail that reason requires
one to have attitude A, then one is rationally required to form or sustain, going for-
ward from t, A, and if the contents of one’s beliefs at t entail that reason does not
permit one to have A, then one is rationally required to revise or refrain from form-
ing, going forward from t, A.
Suppose that p entails that reason does not permit one to believe not-p, and not-p entails
that reason does not permit one to believe p. Then if one believes that p and believes that
not-p, one is rationally required not to believe p and rationally required not to believe not-
p. This, it might be said, explains why, in every akratic or unconscious case, one satisfies a
requirement of rationality. While this alternative would be congenial to my broader ap-
proach, my main worry about it, in the present context, is this. If, similarly, p entails that
reason requires one to believe p, and not-p entails that reason requires one to believe not-p,
then continuing both to believe p and to believe not-p will satisfy as many rational require-
ments as dropping one or both. It is thus unclear how this account would explain sn.NIKO KOLODNY 246
©2007 The Aristotelian Society
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. CVII, Part 3
2. Incoherence is Distinctive. While this account may identify a
problem with incoherence, it might be objected, it does not identify
the  distinctive problem. According to this account, the problem
with persisting in believing p and believing not-p is that one is in a
position to know that one lacks sufficient reason for at least one of
these beliefs. The problem is thus of the same kind as persisting in
two consistent beliefs, when one is in a position to know that one
lacks sufficient reason for at least one of them. Yet do we agree that,
when Watson persists in believing that the butler did it and believing
that the butler did not, Watson makes the same mistake as when he
persists in believing that the butler had a hand in it and believing
that the maid had a hand in it, even though Holmes has told him
that at least one of these beliefs is untenable? Is not the former mis-
take more serious than, or at least different in kind from, the latter?
If we sense a residual difference here, I suspect that it is due to the
difference in the epistemic credentials of the respective second-order
beliefs: a basic and general truth about how best to pursue truth and
avoid falsity in light of a simple logical principle, on the one hand,
and the contingent, particular authority of Holmes, on the other.
Bring these closer together, and the seeming difference, I expect, will
recede.
3. se Presupposes a Requirement of Formal Coherence. This might
be alleged on the following grounds:
Internalism about Evidence: Evidence consists in all or some
special class of our (possibly false) beliefs and/or our (possibly
nonveridical) perceptual states; or the (possibly false) contents
of these beliefs and/or perceptual states.
35
My reply is that while Internalism might make se a requirement of
rationality, it would not make it a requirement of formal coherence
as such. On an internalist view, se might be, for example:
If not-p coheres better than p with one’s other beliefs at t, then
one is required not to believe, going forward from t, that p.
35 I am indebted to Hannah Ginsborg and Michael Smith for pressing this objection.HOW DOES COHERENCE MATTER? 247
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Yet this is narrow scope, not wide.
36 The corresponding wide-scope
formulation:
If not-p coheres better than p with one’s other beliefs at t, then
one is required (either not to believe, going forward from t,
that p, or to revise, going forward from t, one’s other beliefs so
that they cohere sufficiently better with p than with not-p)
would not represent a form of responsiveness to the evidence at all,
or a recognizable kind of theoretical deliberation. It would say, in
effect, ‘Either believe only what the evidence supports, or change the
evidence.’
37 Moreover, if evidence depends on perceptual states (or
their contents), then the requirement cannot avoid being narrow
scope, since one has no option of revising how things appeared to
one at a given time.
38
4. Why Must F(p)T(p)? Perhaps there are cases in which
F(p)T(p). In such cases, one might object, se fails, and so epistem-
ic reason cannot explain vn.
First, if there were such cases, cs would not hold in them. The
plausibility of cs, therefore, is reason to doubt that there are such
cases. Second, if there are such cases, vn may not hold in them. If
so, then they leave nothing for n to explain.
Third, suppose, that F(p)=T(p). Then, just when the evidence is
evenly balanced, epistemic reason permits us both to believe p and
to believe not-p. However, even if we assume n, we are still permit-
ted either to believe p and not believe not-p, or not to believe p and
to believe not-p, or not to believe p and not to believe not-p. This
permissiveness is at odds with the phenomenology of epistemic de-
liberation. From the first-person standpoint, we do not, in fact, ex-
perience this kind of arbitrary liberty either to believe p alone, or to
believe not-p alone, or to believe neither. This suggests:
36 In addition, the internalist’s se presumably governs kinds of coherence that are not
strictly formal.
37 Henny Youngman: ‘When I read about the evils of drinking, I gave up reading.’
38 The normativity of these rational requirements would not be problematic in the same way
as requirements of formal coherence, since they would also be requirements of reason.NIKO KOLODNY 248
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Epistemic Strictness (es): Reason either forbids a belief, or it re-
quires it.
39
And if es and F(p)=T(p) hold, then when the evidence is evenly bal-
anced, either reason forbids both beliefs, or reason requires both. If
reason forbids both beliefs, then again nothing is left for n to explain.
Suppose, finally, that either reason requires both, or F(p)T(p).
Under either supposition, n sometimes requires us to violate epis-
temic reason. True, if n always ‘trumped’ epistemic reason in these
cases, then vn would be explained. But the very idea that there is
such conflict here—that one cannot avoid either violating what rea-
son requires or what rationality requires—is questionable. Whatev-
er our view of the content of requirements of reason and of
rationality, we might have expected their contents to be compatible,
in the following sense:
Ideal Compatibility: If one is required at t by reason to X and
required at t by rationality not to X, then there should be some
earlier time t  and response Y such that if one had given at t 
response Y, then one would not be both required at t by reason
to X and required at t by rationality not to X.
Granted, if one comes to the false belief that reason prohibits what
it in fact requires, then, because of one’s past mistake, it may be ir-
rational of one to do what reason requires. (br implies as much.)
What is harder to accept, and what Ideal Compatibility rules out, is
that this was fated to be so: that there was nothing one could have
done to avoid being either irrational or unreasonable now. This is
the ‘Problem of Conflict’.
V
Can the Error Theory Be Extended to Other Requirements of For-
mal Coherence? To extend this error theory to other requirements
of formal coherence, we need to show that analogues of the com-
39 Compare White (2005). es says that one is always required to make up one’s mind in a
particular way, if one makes it up. But one may be merely permitted to make up one’s mind.HOW DOES COHERENCE MATTER? 249
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ment on reason patterns, r1, can explain analogues of the violation
claim, vn. Let me sketch, in a highly compressed way, some possible
explanations, and the problems they face.
Single-Premiss Closure (c): When q is a logical consequence of
p, one is rationally required (if at t one believes p, then at t to
believe q).
would explain:
Violation Claim about Single-Premiss Closure (vc): When q is
a logical consequence of p, if at t one believes p, but does not
believe q, then one violates some norm.
Suppose, however, that we accept es and:
Evidence Transmission (et): When q is a logical consequence of
p, the evidence that q is at least as strong as the evidence that p.
Suppose that one has sufficient reason to believe p. Then there is suf-
ficient evidence, in an absolute sense, to decide the question whether
p, and sufficiently stronger evidence that p than that not-p to permit
the belief that p. Suppose that the evidential demands—the thresh-
olds of sufficient and sufficiently stronger evidence—for the ques-
tion whether p are no lower than for the question whether q.
40 Then,
by et, there is sufficient evidence, in an absolute sense, to decide the
question whether q, and sufficiently stronger evidence that q than
that not-q to permit the belief that q. Presumably, there is sufficient
reason to believe q, and, by es, conclusive reason to believe q.
Second Comment about Reason Patterns (r2): When q is a log-
ical consequence of p, either one lacks sufficient reason to be-
lieve p, or one has conclusive reason to believe q.
41
One might object that this is true only when qualified in several
40 In terms of the decision-theoretic analogy, that F(p)/T(p)F(q)/T(q).
41 In terms of the decision-theoretic analogy, et is: If p entails q, then E(q)E(p). If
F(p)/T(p)F(q)/T(q), then this implies: If p entails q, then (ignoring zero denominators)
E(p)/E(not-p)F(p)/T(p) entails E(q)/E(not-q)F(q)/T(q). And this is essentially r2.NIKO KOLODNY 250
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ways. First, perhaps the believer must be in a position to know that q
is a logical consequence of p; that consequence must not be too re-
mote.
42 Second, perhaps the believer must have conclusive reason to
make up his mind whether q; q must not be irrelevant or trivial.
43 Fi-
nally, in some cases, the evidential demands on the question whether
q may be higher than the evidential demands on the question wheth-
er p; it might matter more whether q than whether p. ‘So qualified,’
it might be said, ‘r2 does not explain vc. Therefore, we need c.’ This
response again invites the Problems of Normativity and Conflict. (If
the evidential demands whether q are higher than whether p, for ex-
ample, then epistemic reason may require one to believe p, but forbid
one from believing q.) In any event, I suspect that those who qualify
r2 in these ways will also qualify vc and c in similar ways. (Do we
wish to say, for example, that, while one is not required by reason to
deduce Zorn’s Lemma from the Axiom of Choice, one is irrational
for failing to?) The qualified r2 might well explain the qualified vc.
The more troubling feature of this error theory is its reliance on
es. Without es, r2 does not follow. One might have merely suffi-
cient, but not conclusive, reason to believe p, and likewise merely
sufficient reason to believe q. Thus, one might believe p, but fail to
believe q, without violating any requirement of reason. To my mind,
es seems a basic feature of theoretical deliberation. Still, others
might deny it, or worry that it is too uncertain a basis for something
as fundamental as single-premiss closure.
The analogous problem is far more serious for:
Means–End: One is rationally required (either not to intend at t
to E, or not to believe at t that one will E only if one intends at
t to M, or to intend at t to M).
44
One might try to explain the following:
Violation Claim about Means–End Incoherence (vm): If one in-
tends at t to E, believes at t that one will E only if one intends
42 See Broome (2004).
43 See Harman (1986) and Broome (2005).
44 For explanation why intending to M, rather than M-ing, must be believed to be a neces-
sary means, see Broome (2002), Kamm (2000), and Searle (2001, p. 266).HOW DOES COHERENCE MATTER? 251
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at t to M but does not intend at t to M, then one violates some
requirement,
by appeal to:
Practical Transmission (pt): If one has conclusive reason to be-
lieve that one will E only if one Fs, then one has reason to F
that is at least as strong as one’s reason to E,
45
substituting ‘intend at t to M’ for ‘F.’ Suppose, however, that while
one has conclusive reason to believe that one will E only if one in-
tends to M, one has merely sufficient reason to intend to E. It is then
consistent with pt that one has merely sufficient reason to intend to
M. In such a case, one may intend to E, believe that one will E only
if one intends to M, and not intend to M without violating any re-
quirement of reason. This could not happen, if there were a practi-
cal analogue to es. But there is no such analogue.
46
Taking a different tack, suppose, first, that one has sufficient rea-
son to believe that one will E only if one intends to M, but, in fact,
one does not intend to M. Ordinarily,
Self-Knowledge (sk): If one does not intend at t to M, then one
has conclusive reason to believe at t that one does not intend at
t to M
holds, so that intending to E does not raise the epistemic probability
that one Es. From:
Effectiveness: One has sufficient reason to intend to E only if
intending to E raises the epistemic probability
47 that one Es,
45 This is in the spirit of the ‘facilitative principle’ of Raz (2005). One might resist the idea
that the reason for the agent to F is relative to the reason for him to believe the means–end
claim. For if we know that his evidence is misleading (and if F-ing is otherwise pointless),
will we not advise him not to F? Yes, but we will also advise him not to believe the means-
end claim. Drawing on the relativist semantics of the kind proposed by MacFarlane (2005),
one might conjecture that the truth of a proposition about a person’s reason to act or believe
is relative to the evidence available to the person assessing the proposition. Relative to the
agent’s context of assessment, there is reason for him to believe the means–end claim and to
F, but relative to our context of assessment, knowing what we know, there is not. In either
context of assessment, however, pt holds, as stated. MacFarlane and I may explore this con-
jecture in future work.
46 This is an instance of what Bratman (1987) calls ‘the importance of Buridan’.
47 Some might resist making one’s reason epistemically relative. See note 45 attached to pt.NIKO KOLODNY 252
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it would then follow that:
Third Comment about Reason Patterns (r3): If one does not
intend at t to M, then either one lacks sufficient reason to be-
lieve that one will E only if one intends at t to M, or one lacks
sufficient reason to intend to E.
48
This, however, would not supply a general explanation of akratic
cases, analogous to those described in §III, in which the agent seems
to satisfy some requirement by intending M even if he believes that
he lacks sufficient reason to E. Perhaps we can do without a general
explanation of akratic cases in the theoretical sphere. But given the
greater prevalence of akratic cases in the practical sphere, one might
hope that more could be said.
This may lead us to a ‘cognitivist’ theory, which identifies not an
intention, but instead an associated belief, for which one lacks suffi-
cient reason.
49 Take someone who does not intend to M. Then, at
least when sk holds, she has conclusive reason to believe that she
does not intend to M. Suppose that she also has sufficient reason to
believe that she will not E if she does not intend to M. Then, in most
cases, she has conclusive reason to believe that she will not E. But if
she intends to E, then
Non-Defeatism: If one intends at t to E, then one does not be-
lieve at t that one will not E
50
entails that she lacks this belief. This supports:
Fourth Comment about Reason Patterns (r4): If one does not
intend at t to M, but one does intend at t to E, then either one
lacks sufficient reason to believe at t that one will E only if one
intends at t to M, or one has conclusive reason to believe at t
that one will not E, but refuses to believe it.
48 This assumes the analogue of Evidentialism in the case of intention: that all reasons for
intention derive from the reasons for the action intended. As it happens, I believe that there
are exceptions. But, when made explicit, these seem to tell against vm.
49 Compare Broome (forthcoming); Harman (1986; 1999); Setiya (forthcoming); Velleman
(1989; 2000; ms.); and Wallace (2001). For doubts, particularly about sk, see Bratman
(forthcoming a and b).
50 See Bratman (1987).HOW DOES COHERENCE MATTER? 253
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This, in turn, would suffice to explain vm.
The most troubling feature of r3 and r4 is that they rely on sk. sk
surely fails in some cases. One is not always in a position to know
what one does not intend. However, it is not obvious to me that vm
will hold in such cases. To settle this, we would need to examine, in
greater detail than we can here, specific examples.
Even if we can explain vc and vm, I doubt that we can explain
other violation claims. I do not want to argue too strenuously that
no comment corresponds to:
Violation Intuition about Logicality (vl): If not-pn is a logical
consequence of p1 and p2, …, pn−1, then if at t one believes p1,
believes p2, …, and believes pn, then one violates some require-
ment; and if pn is a logical consequence of p1, p2, …, pn−1, and
at t one believes p1, believes p2, …, and believes pn−1, but does
not believe pn, then one violates some requirement.
If there were such a comment, this would be a congenial result.
51
But I doubt that such a comment can be vindicated, for much-dis-
cussed reasons. In the well-known ‘preface’ and ‘lottery’ cases, there
is—to all appearances—sufficient and sufficiently stronger evidence
for each of a series of claims than for their negations, but also suffi-
cient and sufficiently stronger evidence for the negation of their con-
junction than for their conjunction. Suppose the evidence can
assume such a pattern and something like the decision-theoretic
analogy is correct. Then to deny that the believer has sufficient rea-
son for inconsistent beliefs when the evidence assumes such a pat-
tern is, in effect, to insist, implausibly, that no chance of truth, no
matter how great, can justify any risk of falsity, no matter how
small. This is, in turn, to insist that we lack sufficient reason to be-
lieve any epistemically contingent claim.
52
Similar considerations lead me to believe that no comment corre-
sponds to:
51 See, for example, Pollock (1986), which, in effect, defends such a comment.
52 Makinson (1965) and Kyburg (1970) are the classics. There is also the famous suggestion
of Harman (1986) that the proper response to some philosophical paradoxes may be to
retain the paradoxical beliefs until we know which to give up. Christensen (2004) makes a
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Violation Intuition about Intention Inconsistency (vi): If one
intends at t to E1, intends at t to E2, and believes at t that if one
E1s, then one does not E2, then one violates some norm.
Even if one knows that one cannot succeed in both E1-ing and E2-
ing, one may also know that intending both gives one a better
chance of succeeding in either than, and is no more costly than, in-
tending only one.
53 In such a case, one might have conclusive reason
to intend to E1, to intend to E2, and to believe that one cannot suc-
ceed in both.
We might appeal to requirements of formal coherence to shore up
the violation claims. But this would once again invite the Problems
of Normativity and Conflict. Alternatively, the guiding idea of our
approach thus far—that whatever truth there is in violation claims
is explained by facts about the pattern of reasons—might embolden
us to question the violation claims themselves, as being overgeneral-
izations of a kind.
Let me say something about general logicality, leaving intention
consistency for another time.
54 How does logic govern belief? vl
represents one answer: that logic somehow governs belief directly,
such that if our beliefs are not consistent and closed, we violate
some norm. Our discussion of r1 and r2 represents a different an-
swer: that logic governs belief indirectly, by structuring epistemic
reason, which in turn directly governs belief. On this view, logic, so
to speak, informs epistemic reason of possible patterns of truth and
falsity.
55 Epistemic reason takes these patterns into account in deter-
mining how best to pursue the aims of acquiring truth and avoiding
falsity in light of the evidence. For example, the simple facts that if
not-p is true, then p is false, and that if q is a logical consequence of
p, then if p is true, q is true, underlie the evidential principles se and
et, which in turn explain r1 and r2.
56 The fact that epistemic rea-
son takes into account the implications of logical relations for pat-
terns of truth and falsity, however, does not imply that epistemic
53 As McCann (1991) suggests, Bratman’s (1987) ‘video game’ example is one such case.
54 See Kolodny (ms.b).
55 Of course, there are other sources of information, besides logic, about possible patterns of
truth and falsity. If logic governs belief in a special way (and perhaps, as Harman 1986,
claims, it does not) it is because it is somehow specially available to us, and so its contribu-
tion to epistemic reason is specially insensitive to our particular evidential situation.HOW DOES COHERENCE MATTER? 255
©2007 The Aristotelian Society
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. CVII, Part 3
reason always requires a pattern of belief that is itself logical. There
remains the possibility that we best pursue the aims of acquiring
truth and avoiding falsity, on the basis of information that logic
gives us about the possible patterns of truth and falsity, by adopting
a pattern of belief that it not itself logical. If the preface and lottery
cases are telling, then this possibility is actual. The question, then, is
whether, as vl implies, logic does double duty, not only structuring
what epistemic reason requires, but also placing an independent
constraint on belief that sometimes countermands what epistemic
reason requires. This begins to seem like a fetish for a certain mental
pattern.
It is worth discussing a different response to doubts about vl:
(i) Some kind of general formal coherence must govern our
basic cognitive attitudes: that is, some relevant violation in-
tuitions must hold for them.
(ii) vl does not hold for full beliefs.
(iii) However, the following:
Violation Intuition about Probabilistic Coherence (vp):
If one has degrees of belief that are not probabilistic—
that do not satisfy the probability axioms—then one vi-
olates some norm,
does hold for degrees of belief.
(iv) Therefore, our basic cognitive attitudes are degrees of be-
lief, governed by probabilistic coherence (perhaps with full
beliefs being degrees of belief higher than some threshold
less than one).
57
Let me first say a bit about (iii), before addressing (i).
56 My claim is similar in structure to, but somewhat different in substance from, the view of
Hawthorne and Bovens (1999) and Christensen (2004) that logic informs norms of proba-
bilistic coherence, which in turn directly constrain degrees of belief. First, what are directly
constrained are degrees of evidence, not degrees of belief. (As we note below, it does not fol-
low from the fact that evidence is probabilistic that it supports a probabilistic pattern of
belief.) Second, at the moment, we are concerned not with degrees of belief, but instead with
full beliefs. Finally, se and et might hold even if evidence is not fully probabilistic.
57 Christensen (2004), and perhaps also Hawthorne and Bovens (1999), suggest something
like this line of argument. Holton (forthcoming) considers a similar response to doubts
about vi.NIKO KOLODNY 256
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Epistemic reason may be able to explain vp. Following Joyce
(1998), we may accept:
Evidentialism for Degrees: Epistemic reason aims for degrees
of belief that minimize ‘inaccuracy,’ where inaccuracy is the
sum, for every member, p, of a set of propositions, of T(D(p)) if
p is true or F(D(p)) if p is false, where D(p) is the degree of be-
lief in p, T(D(p)) decreases as D(p) approaches 1, and F(D(p))
decreases as D(p) approaches 0.
Joyce proves that if the measure of inaccuracy meets certain con-
straints then, for any set of degrees of belief that is not probabilistic,
there is some probabilistic set that is less inaccurate, by that meas-
ure, no matter what the actual state of the world. If the measure of
inaccuracy meets these constraints, this argument would plausibly
support:
Fifth Comment about Reason Patterns: The set of degrees of
belief that epistemic reason requires is probabilistic.
However, it would not explain the normativity of the wide-scope re-
quirement of formal coherence:
Probabilistic Coherence (p): One is rationally required to have
at t any one of the probabilistic sets of degrees of belief.
Not all probabilistic sets of degrees of belief are guaranteed to be
more accurate no matter what the state of the world.
Whether the measure of inaccuracy that informs epistemic reason
satisfies Joyce’s constraints, however, is an open question. It is not
obvious why epistemic reason should not care more about accuracy
at the extremes (so that, for example, T(0.9)−T(0.99)T(0.4)−
T(0.49)), or about minimizing the degree of belief in falsehoods, so
that F(D(p))T(D(p))—the partial-belief analogue to F(p)T(p).
This would imply measures of inaccuracy that violate Joyce’s con-
straints.
58 The upshot is that we might be left with something like a
preface case, in which aiming to be faithful to reality, on a not im-
plausible conception of what that amounts to, leads to degrees of
belief that are not probabilistically coherent.HOW DOES COHERENCE MATTER? 257
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This being said, one might ask what argues for (i): that our cogni-
tive attitudes must be directly governed by some general, suitably
‘formal’ coherence. The broader lesson of the preface, one might
have thought, is not simply that vl is untenable, but moreover that
it is a mistake to insist that our cognitive attitudes must fit some
pattern of formal coherence—or indeed any pattern other than the
pattern that best conduces to fidelity to what, and only what, is so.
If we take this lesson, it is unclear why, finding logical coherence un-
tenable, we should seek refuge in probabilistic coherence. So, on the
one hand, it is unclear why, if epistemic reason does support vp, this
is itself a reason to replace a framework of full beliefs with a frame-
work of degrees. And, on the other hand, it is unclear why, if epis-
temic reason does not support vp, this is reason for concern. If what
best serves our aim of faithfully representing what is so, and only
what is so, is not a probabilistic pattern, then what is left to be said
for such a pattern? Why should it, any more than logicality, reflect
something other than a fetish for a certain psychic order?
59
58 Gibbard (forthcoming) suggests the first kind of measure, which would violate Joyce’s
constraints of Weak Convexity and Symmetry. The second kind would violate Joyce’s Nor-
mality. Maher (2002) motivates, on other grounds, the simple absolute value measure:
T(D(p))=|1−D(p)| and F(D(p))=|D(p)|, which also violates Joyce’s Weak Convexity and
Symmetry.
Returning to our decision-theoretic analogy, we might propose that epistemic reason re-
quires us to select D(p) so as to minimize expected inaccuracy. Assuming these functions are
differentiable, and ignoring zero denominators, a necessary and sufficient condition for a
minimum is:
E(p)/E(not-p) = −F (D(p))/T (D(p)).
If the measures of inaccuracy satisfy:
Minimum: D(p)/[1−D(p)] = −F (D(p))/T (D(p)),
and if degrees of evidence are probabilistic, then degrees of belief will equal degrees of evi-
dence, and so be probabilistic themselves. But none of the measures of inaccuracy discussed
above satisfy Minimum, and, of course, this argument must assume, whereas Joyce’s need
not, that evidence is probabilistic.
59 Abandoning Evidentialism, one might try to support vp or p on ‘pragmatic’ grounds. On
a naïve interpretation, the Dutch book argument shows that (as Richard Bradley points out
to me) we have at least pro tanto reason to  satisfy the wide-scope p. Any probabilistic  set
avoids a Dutch book, so there is at least that to be said for satisfying p in any way. And so,
perhaps, if, for every non-probabilistic set, there is some probabilistic set that is at least as
good in other respects, then for every non-probabilistic set, there is some probabilistic set
that one has conclusive reason to replace it with. This would be, in effect, a comment on
reason patterns supporting vp. But the Dutch book argument would not show that we have
conclusive reason to satisfy the wide-scope p. Some probabilistic sets are vastly worse thanNIKO KOLODNY 258
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VI
Conclusion: The Inescapability of Rationality. It is hard to find a
place for requirements of formal coherence as such. They are not
animated by our concern to believe the true and choose the worth-
while. They are not explained by any plausible constitutive claim.
And they cannot plausibly be viewed as ends in themselves. Moreo-
ver, some requirements of formal coherence as such would consign
even the most informed and conscientious person to either violating
reason, or violating rationality.
I have tried to say how we might do without requirements of for-
mal coherence as such. We would have to deny certain violation
claims, such as vp, vi, and perhaps vp, as overgeneralizations. We
would have to deny, likewise, some akratic and unreflective cases, at
least where n and c are concerned. And we would have to maintain
that F(p)T(p), es and sk hold, or hold often enough. Some may
find this too much to deny, or to maintain. The demands of formal
coherence, they may believe, admit of fewer exceptions, or rest on a
surer foundation. If they are right, then we are committed, by our
own judgement, to principles that we cannot, on reflection, make
sense of. This would itself be an interesting result, although also an
unsettling one.
Suppose, however, that we can reconcile ourselves to there being
no requirements of formal coherence as such. In closing, I want to
ask where this leaves the tendency, which I discussed earlier, to see
requirements of formal coherence as such as the core or basis of
normativity. This tendency has several sources. To many, problems
about the metaphysics, epistemology, and motivational force of
norms seem somehow more tractable for requirements of formal co-
some non-probabilistic sets, even taking into account their comparative insulation from
Dutch books. The classic sources are Ramsey (1926) and de Finetti (1937). See also Hájek
(2005) for a recent survey and reconstruction.
Representation Theorem arguments, and the Dutch book argument less naïvely inter-
preted, show that probabilistic incoherence entails formal incoherence among preferences.
This shifts the burden of explanation onto the relevant requirements of formal coherence
on preferences. From there, the dialectic follows a familiar course. There may be comments
on reason patterns that support violation claims about the relevant kinds of formal inco-
herence in preference. But these comments will not support the corresponding wide-scope
requirements of formal coherence as such, since many ways of satisfying these require-
ments lead one no closer to reason. The classic here is Savage (1954). For an accessible, but
thorough, presentation, see Mas-Colell et al. (1995). Skyrms (1987) urges this less literal-
minded interpretation of the Dutch book argument.HOW DOES COHERENCE MATTER? 259
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herence
60 than for reasons. I suspect, however, that much of its im
petus, though it is sometimes expressed in ‘metaethical’ or ‘second-
order’ terms, is really ‘substantive’ or ‘first order’. Requirements of
formal coherence are all there is to normativity, or its only sure
foundation—the thought runs—because they are the only norma-
tive premisses that cannot be denied, or escaped. It is only too easy
to shrug off assertions that this is an intrinsic good, or that that is
the correct prior probability. But no one can fail to feel the weight of
a charge of irrationality: that one believes contradictory things, or
refuses to take the means to one’s own ends. What gives the idea its
appeal, in other words, is the sense that the question ‘Why should
I?’ can be settled only by the answer: ‘Otherwise, you will be inco-
herent.’
But why, exactly, should charges of formal irrationality be ‘unde-
niable’ or ‘inescapable’ in this way? If other norms can be denied,
why not requirements of formal coherence? Some may reply that
they are simply obvious, while others may appeal to the idea, dis-
cussed in §II, that they partly constitute what, or whom, they gov-
ern.
The discussion of §III offers a different explanation. To the extent
that someone who violates a putative requirement of formal coher-
ence is being irrational, as opposed to simply failing respond to the
reasons that apply to her, it is because she violates BR. She refuses
to revise an attitude that she herself judges that she should revise.
No wonder, then, that advisee cannot outrun advisor. For so long as
the charge of irrationality applies, they are one and the same.
61
This explanation of what makes charges of formal irrationality
inescapable, however, suggests that requirements of formal coher-
ence cannot play the hoped-for role: they can offer no answers, cer-
tain or otherwise, to the deliberator’s question, ‘Why should I?’.
This is because charges of irrationality only inherit their seeming
normative force from the normative force that a deliberator attaches
to the content of a judgement about reasons: about the evidence for
a belief, or the value of a possible choice. Granted, nothing may set-
tle her question, ‘Why should I?’ But if anything does, it must be
60 Or for requirements of rationality more generally. The point is made with characteristic
force and clarity by Smith (2004b, pp. 181–4).
61 I am greatly indebted to Jollimore (2005). Here, I just push a suggestion of his to its log-
ical conclusion.NIKO KOLODNY 260
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sought in what she judges, rather than in the agreement of her judg-
ing with the other activities of her mind.
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